doi.org/10.52340/eab.2025.17.02.01

ჟურნალი N 2. 2025

The contemporary world continues to operate within an international order established after World War II and later revised in the early 1990s. This system, known as the rules-based world order, is founded on the principles of international law and institutions. At its core lies the fundamental respect for state sovereignty and the inviolability of national borders. Additionally, this order is marked by the United States’ predominant global influence and the widespread adoption of liberal principles in post-communist states, as well as certain regions of the so-called “Third World.” Consequently, it is often referred to as “Pax Americana,” signifying a liberal-democratic world framework. However, its crisis – originating in the early 2000s – has persisted to this day.
Several epochal events contributed to the gradual destabilization of the existing world order. The declaration of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008, and the annexation of Crimea in 2012 marked significant geopolitical shifts. Meanwhile, the U.S. military setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the global financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009, further accelerated the erosion of the established international framework.
A new world order is currently taking shape, characterized by several defining features:
• Multipolarity (polypolarity): Two dominant poles – the United States and China – are clearly emerging, while Russia, the European Union, and India seek to establish themselves as global players.
• Redistribution of influence: Power is being reallocated among global actors, with their interests increasingly legitimized across various strategic regions.
• The illiberal nature of the new world order: It is evident that the new world order can no longer be universally liberal nor a continuation of “Pax Americana.” However, its precise nature remains uncertain – it may evolve as a hybrid system incorporating both liberal and authoritarian elements.
• The dominance of geoeconomics over geopolitics: While economic interests have always shaped political decisions, this dynamic is now more overt than ever. The policies of major global players are being directly dictated by economic imperatives. A striking example is the U.S. administration's approach: from staking a claim on resource-rich Greenland and prioritizing ties with oil-rich Arab states to engaging diplomatically with the Syrian president – previously designated a terrorist – to secure support for Kuwaiti gas exports to Europe. Additionally, agreements such as the U.S.-Ukraine partnership on rare metal extraction in war-torn Ukraine further illustrate this geoeconomic shift.
The principle of geoeconomic priority holds particular significance in shaping the evolving world economic order, whose fundamental structure is undergoing transformation.
• Global uncertainty has risen sharply. The voluntary abdication of world hegemony by the United States has left a vacuum in the existing world order – one that could either be filled through mutually beneficial cooperation among multiple global actors or devolve into multipolar chaos, bringing existential threats to all of humanity.
The transition to a multipolar world order presents significant risks for small and vulnerable countries like Georgia. Georgia’s role in the emerging global landscape is shaped by the strategic interests of major international players in the South Caucasus, where it serves as a key geopolitical link. Given this reality, Georgia must develop a geostrategy centered on its function as a critical connector between East and West, as well as North and South. This strategy should be highly diversified, accommodating the interests of all global actors involved in the evolving geopolitical dynamics. Most importantly, it must aim to maximize benefits for Georgia while ensuring robust security guarantees.
In this regard, Georgia’s participation in the “Middle Corridor” mega-project is of great importance. The key challenge is not only integrating Georgia into the transport and energy corridor but also positioning it as a central economic hub within the Middle Corridor. This requires the establishment of specialized zones adjacent to ports, where cargo passing through Georgia can be processed efficiently. In this regard, it is essential to draw lessons from the successful models of Shanghai, Dubai, Rotterdam, and other global ports.
Equally vital is preparing the groundwork for Georgia to become an energy hub – one that not only facilitates energy transit but also generates power independently, with a strong focus on environmentally sustainable renewable energy. This initiative is expected to attract significant European interest, especially given the ongoing “Green Deal Program,” which aims to make Europe the first carbon-neutral continent by 2050.

Keywords: World order, world economic order, transcontinental globalization, transoceanic (transatlantic) globalization, “Middle Corridor” megaproject, Georgian economy.
JEL Codes: F00, F15, F59, O13, Q42, Q56

References:
• Brzezinski ZB. (2005). Interviu gazet “los anjeles taimsshi“ [Interview in the Newspaper “Los Angeles Times”.] in Georgian
• Davitashvili Z. (2003). natsionalizmi da globalizatsia. [Nationalism and Globalization. Found “Open Society – Georgia”.] in Georgian
• Gvozdevi N. (2023). „kargia, rom es mtavroba gqavt. es natostvis mosakherkhebelia“ [“It’s Good that You Have this Government. It’s Convenient for NATO”.] in Georgian https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/
• Zedelashvili D. (2025). trampi 2.0 – ideologiuri horizonti – postliberaluri momenti [Trump 2.0 – Ideological Horizon – Postliberal Moment.] in georgian https://gnomonwise.org/en/publications/analytics/250
• Mekvabishvili E. (2018). globalizatsiis epokis pinansuri krizisebi da sakartvelos ekonomika. [Financial Crises of the Globalization Era and the Economy of Georgia. Tbilisi: “Intellect”.] in Georgian
• Papava V. (2022). pandeksitis dziritadi ekonomikuri gamotsvevebi. [The Main Economic Challenges of the Pandexit. Georgian Foundation for Strategy and International Relations Research.] in Georgian
• Baker D. (2025). Free Trade Is very Deep. May, CEPR US-EU
• Blenkinsop P. (2025). US-EU Tariff Clash imperils $9.5 Trillion of Business, AmCham Warns. https://www.reuters.com/business/us-eu-tariff-clash-imperils-95-trillion-business-amcham-warns-2025-03-17/
• Bush G. (1991). Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html
• Fukuyama F. (1989). The End of History? The National Interest, No. 16, pp. 3-18
• Fukuyama F. (1992). The End of History and Last Man. L.,N.Y. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_of_History_and_the_Last_Man
• Fukuyama F. (2002). Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08935690902940270
• Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2023). Конец глобализации?
• https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/globalization-not-over-but-changing-in-shape-and-emphasis-by-joseph-s-nye-2023-03/russian
• Toffler A. (2006). Revolutionary Wealth. https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/4375.Revolutionary_Wealth